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APPELLANT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND THE JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
This appeal by the Defendant-Appellant is from an order of the
Fourth Circuit Court, State of Utahf County of Utahf American Fork
Department, Honorable John Backlund, Judge granting

a Summary

Judgment in favor of the Plaintiff-Respondent entered on June 15,
1989, (App-45) and the denial for a new trial entered on July 20,
1989, (App-46).

The record on appeal is the Trial Court's supplied

Index with page numbers assigned to each document herein after
referred to as (R at Index No.)*

The minute entry judgment dated

June 15 # 1989, is (R at 48) (App-45) and the minute entry judgment
dated July 20, 1989, is (R at 18) (App-46).

Also included in the

brief is the set out of specific Exhibits under the cover Appendix
(App).
The amended appeal by the Defendant-Appellant is from an order
of

the Fourth Circuit Court, State of Utah, County

of Utah,

American Fork Department, the auspicate unauthorized clerk-signed
court orders dated June 28, 1989, (R at 42) and the ruling on
motion for Disposition of Property dated August 10, 1989, (R at 2)
(AR attach No. 2A).

The amended record (AR) on appeal is the

Appellant's Amended Docketing Statement dated November 16, 1989,
filed with the Trial Court on November 20, 1989, herein after
referred to as (AR at paragraph No.) or (AR at attachment No.)
specifically set forth on the Defendant's Record on Appeal Index
filed on November 20, 1989.
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The Appellant filed the Appeal on July 20, 1989, (R at 15);
and the Amended Appeal on November 20, 1989; seeking the reversal
of

the

Trial

Court's

rulings

and

remand

for

trial

of

the

Appellant's Counterclaim, also is seeking restitution of property
damages, and other damages and injuries suffered by the Appellant.
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction under Utah Judicial Code 782a-3(d) and Constitution of Utah Art I Sec. 11
STATEMENT OP THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Action.
This action involves various claims against the Defendant-

Appellant brought by the Plaintiff-Respondent when the rent paid
for storage unit facilities was increased, then decreased, then
increased, then decreased.

The Plaintiff-Respondent locked the

Defendant-Appellant's rent-paid storage unit doors May 1988 through
September

10, 1988, in violation of

the

implied

covenant—to

undisturbed access—causing damages for trover and conversion of
the

Defendant-Appellant's

business

property.

The

Plaintiff-

Respondent denied this when accepting the cash rent for August and
September 1988.

Consequently, the Defendant-Appellant calculated

lost earnings from historical earnings records and presented a lien
commencing October 1988 through July 1989, with the appropriate and
timely monthly amortizations, for rent to the Plaintiff-Respondent
who recognized, received, and accepted them.

Then the Plaintiff-

Respondent brought an action for unlawful detainer and restitution
of

the premises

commencing

in January

1989.

Appellant counterclaimed for breach of contract.
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The DefendantThe Trial Court

granted a Summary Judgment against the Defendant-Appellant without
a trial and without any consideration for the Defendant-Appellant's
Counterclaim.
warning,

The

executed

Plaintiff-Respondent/

the Summary

Judgment

despite

against

a

previous

the Defendant-

Appellant, selling all of the Appellant's, his spouse's, and his
children's property, including the exempt property. The DefendantAppellant

disputed

with

the

Trial

Court

and

the

Plaintiff-

Respondent as to real poverty, accountability of property sold
during—Oral Arguments—for bonding on appeal to experience the
immediate implementation of a supplemental relief motion, whereby
the Defendant-Appellant spent 8 days in the Utah County jail for
the alleged contempt of court—not answering specific questions as
requested by the Plaintiff-Respondent, and the Trial Court.

The

Defendant-Appellant

the

has

included

the

ensuing

actions

by

Plaintiff-Respondent in the appropriately filed Amended Docketing
Statement dated November 20, 1989.
B.

Course of Proceeding and Disposition Below.
The

Trial

Court

(Honorable

John

Backlund)

denied

the

Defendant's Motion for Dismissal and granted the Plaintiff's Motion
for

Summary

Judgment

which

included

dismissal

of

Defendant's

Counterclaim with prejudice (R at 48). The actual order reflecting
this ruling was entered by the court on June 15, 1989, (App-45).
The Defendant filed several motions with the Trial Court commencing
June 19, 1989, through July 21, 1989, (R at 45, 44, 38, 37, 36, 35,
34,

33,

31,

30,

correspondingly

24,

filed

23,

22,

several

21,

20,

motions

17).
with

The
the

Plaintiff

Trial

Court

commencing June 27, 1989,through July 14, 1989, (R at 42, 41, 40,
-3-

39, 29, 28). The Trial Court (Honorable John Backlund) denied the
Defendants motions (R at 18). The actual order reflecting this
ruling

was

entered

by

the court

on July

20, 1989,

(App-46).

Defendant appeals from that judgment on July 20, 1989, (R at 15).
The Defendant served the Notice of Appeal, WARNING—consequences
of the action—sale of the Defendant's property—a property bond-and Notice of Extra Ordinary Writ on July 21, 1989.
attached hereto as page (App-1) in the Appendix.

A copy is

The Plaintiff

executed the sale on July 25, 1989, at 12 noon despite the warning-selling the Defendant's, his spouse's, and his children's exempt
property. Immediately

and subsequently, upon learning

from the

Defendant by telephone that the Court of Appeals Extra Ordinary
Writ

case

No.

890455

was

denied—also,

that

the

Defendant's

proposed Order to grant Temporary Restraining Order against the
Plaintiff

dated

July

25, 1989, was denied,

(R at

16).

The

Defendant filed several Motions for Disposition of Property (R at
13

and

7).

The

Plaintiff

filed

a Motion

for

Objection

to

Disposition of Property (R at 4 ) . The Trial Court (Honorable John
Backlund) granted in part, Defendant's request for Disposition of
Property

(R at 2). The actual order reflecting this ruling was

entered by the Trial Court on August 10, 1989, (AR at attach No.
2A).

The Defendant appeals from that judgment (AR at par. Nos. 8,

9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18), and (AR at attach No.
2A, 2B, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14).
The

Plaintiff

and

Defendant

appeared

for

Oral

Arguments

September 26, 1989, (AR at par. Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7), and (AR
at

attach

Nos. 1, 3, 2, 4, 6, and
-4-

5).

Subsequent

to—Oral

Arguments—i.e. bonding, the Trial Court instituted immediately/
upon

request

of

the Plaintiff,

a Supplemental

pursuant to Utah Judicial Code No. 78-3.8,

Relief Motion,

(AR at par. Nos. 8, 9.

10, 11/ 12, 13/ 14/ 15/ 16/ 17/ and 18) f and (AR at attach Nos. 8,
9/ 10/ 11/ 12/ 13/ 14/ and 15). Subsequent to several motions and
orders with the Court of Appeals, the Court of Appeals set the
Appellant's briefing schedule due December 27, 1989.
C.

Relevant Facts With Citations to the Record.
The Respondent has painted/ where all can see, on the outside

of the storage unit walls facing Interstate 15 near the American
Fork/ Utah/ 5th East exit the professed claim:
"Electronic Security. R.V. and Boat Spaces
Personal and Business. You Keep the Key"
whereby the Respondent explicitly implies a covenant to any tenant
needing their facilities that the property is protected for both
personal and business property stored in their facilities and the
tenant has undisturbed access/ thus keeping the key.
The Appellant entered into a month to month Rental Agreement/
which was provided by the Respondent/ as a condition of renting
their facilities/ on June 12/ 1987 (R at 74) (App-42) for storage
units Nos. 143 and 144 at the agreed monthly rental rate of $55 per
month for both units.

The Rental Agreement states,

paragraph II

Rent:
"Owner may increase the Rent by notifying
Occupant in writing at least 15 days prior to
the first day of the month for which the
Increased Rent is due. Occupant shall pay the
Increased Rent from the date it becomes
effective. An Occupant unwilling to pay the
Increased Rent may terminate the Rental
Agreement as provided in Item III below."
-5-

The Rental Agreement states, paragraph IIIr Period of Occupancy:
"The Period of Occupancy created by this
Rental Agreement shall begin as of the date of
this Rental Agreement and shall continue from
month to month.
Occupant or Owner may
terminate the Occupancy created by this Rental
Agreement by delivering written notice to the
other party of its intention to do so at least
15 days prior to the last day of the Rental
Month."
The

Appellant

followed

the

terms

and

conditions

of

the

Respondent's provided Rental Agreement (App-42) paying the agreed
rent in the amount of $55 per month for both units until January
1988 when the Respondent's duly authorized agent—with

apparent

authority—Ms. Audrey Hooper, attempted to increase the rent in
violation of the Rental Agreement notification requirements.

A

copy is attached hereto as page (App-2); Audrey Hooper's deposition
dated

April

29,

1989,

Plaintiff's

(Exhibit

No.

4)

and

the

Defendant's response as page (App-3) Defendant's (Exhibit 1 ) , (R
at 70).
The

Respondent

properly

and

appropriately

notified

the

Appellant of a rent increase to be effective the following month,
February 1, 1988.

The Appellant paid accordingly the appropriate

$80 per month for both units, for each month, February 1988 through
April 1988.
The

Respondent's

duly

authorized

agent—with

apparent

authority—MS. Audrey Hooper, appropriately noticed the decreased
rent April 20, 1988, to be effective May 1, 1988, and accepted the
Appellant's timely paid and properly noticed rent payment, check
No. 160.

A copy is attached hereto as page (App-4) Defendant's

(Exhibit 3), (R at 70).
-6-

The Respondent asserts in the Affidavit of Audrey Hooper dated
April 29, 1989/ that she made a mistake, and explained this to the
Appellant, (par. Nos. 5, 6, and 7). A copy is attached hereto as
page (App-5), (R at 56). The Respondent declares in the deposition
of Audrey Hooper dated April 29, 1989, (pages 10 and 11) that she
did not explain this to the Appellant.

A copy is attached hereto

as page (App-6), (R at 50). Perhaps an act of fraud!
The

Respondents

duly

authorized

agent—with

apparent

authority—Ms. Audrey Hooper, subsequent to receiving the timely
paid and appropriately noticed decreased rent check No. 160 in the
amount of $55, immediately locked the Appellant's rent-paid storage
unit doors, a violation of the impled covenant
access

then deposited

Admitted

Respondent's

the check

to undisturbed

in the bank on May

Statement

of

Points

and

7, 1988.

Authorities

in

Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, (R at 56 par. No. 14)
The Appellant submitted to the duly authorized

agent—with

apparent authority—Ms. Audrey Hooper, the legal rental amount of
$55 for the month of June 1988, check No. 175. A copy is attached
hereto as page (App-7), Defendant's (Exhibit 4), (R at 70) and a
letter

dated

increase

June

dated May

6,

1988, indicating

24, 1988, was

that

the

in violation

noticed
of

rent

the Rental

Agreement notification requirements specifically explained in the
January 2, 1988, letter as page (App-3).
as

page

(App-8),

Defendant's

(Exhibit

A copy is attached hereto
4A), (R at

70).

The

Respondent continued with the willful and wanton violation of the
impled

covenant

to undisturbed

access admitted

No. 14).
-7-

(R at

56 par.

The Appellant submitted to the duly authorized agent—with
apparent authority—Ms. Audrey Hooper, the legal rental amount of
$55 for the month of July 1988, check No. 190. A copy is attached
hereto as page (App-7) Defendant's (Exhibit 4), (R at 70) and a
letter dated July 6, 1988, indicating a warning of the Respondent's
persisted violation of the implied covenant to undisturbed access.
A copy is attached hereto as page (App-9) Defendant's (Exhibit 4B),
(R at 70).
The Appellant again submitted to the duly authorized agent-with apparent authority— Ms. Audrey Hooper letter dated July 13,
1988, a copy is attached hereto as page (App-10) Defendant's
(Exhibit 4C), (R at 70), to no avail, since the Respondent
persisted with the willful and wanton violation of the implied
covenant

to

undisturbed

access

with

full

knowledge

to

the

supervising principal, Mr. Steven J. Nelson, and Mr. Randy Miller,
admitted

(R at

56

par. No.

14). Further

declared

in

the

Respondent's Deposition of Audrey Hooper dated April 29, 1989, page
No. 12. A copy is attached hereto as page (App-11). Moreover, the
Affidavit of Steven J. Nelson dated May 15, 1989, (par. No. 2) (R
at 56), as page (App-14).
The Appellant submitted to the duly authorized agent—with
apparent authority—Ms.Audrey Hooper, the legal rental amount of
$55 for the month of August 1988, check No. 199, a copy is attached
hereto as page (App-7) Defendant's (Exhibit 4), (R at 70) to gain
knowledge, letter dated August 13, 1988. A copy is attached hereto
as page (App-12), (R at 70) that the Respondent had replaced the
Hoopers with a Vera M. Alex, sending the timely payment of rent
-8-

proclaiming/ MWe are asking you to vacate the units #143 and

back

144 immediately."

Nevertheless, the Respondent persisted with the

willful and wanton violation of the implied covenant to undisturbed
access keeping the Appellant's rent-paid storage units locked.
Admitted (R at 56 par. No. 14).
Finally going into the 5th month the Appellant/ tried again
to mitigate damages by placing in the hands of the new managers/
the duly authorized agent—with apparent authority—the September
1988 rent payment in the amount of $55/ check No. 221 as page (App7)/

(R at 70) which he held in abeyance commingled with a letter

dated September 9f 1988.
13)/

A copy is attached hereto as page (App-

(R at 70)/ whereby Mr. Ray Alexf the duly authorized agent

requested in an amicable manner that I meet with his supervising
principal/ Mr. Steven J. Nelsonf the following day, September 10 r
1988.
The Appellant cordially greed to visit with his supervising
principal/ Mr. Steven J. Nelson/ and his managing agent/ Mr. Ray
Alex, on September 10/ 1988.

Principal and Agent (admitted on

motion to strike counterclaim and alternative reply second defense,
[R at 65 p. 2 par. 3]) for purposes of explaining
contract provisions.

their own

Please review Defendant's Answer (par. No.

4)/ (R at 70).
The Appellant
locking

of

the

further

requested

Appellant's

damages

rent-paid

for

storage

the unlawful
unit

doors,

notwithstanding the written warning letters (App-9f 10f and 13)
with an arrogant announcement

"take me to court"/

Answer (par. 8) (R at 70).
-9-

Appellant's

The Respondent's alleged, Complaint allegation No. 15 (R at
74) and the Affidavit of Steven J. Nelson (par No. 4 ) , (R at 56).
A

copy

is attached

hereto

as page

(App-14) states

that

the

Appellant entered into another agreement or appropriate written
notice for Owner occupancy termination.

The Respondent did not

provide any payment of moving expenses for the one terminating the
occupancy on September 10, 1988.

However, the Respondent finally

admits (R at 29 par. 2 ) , "Plaintiff does not rely on any other
agreement besides the initial written agreement".

The Respondent,

did not provide any written notice of occupancy termination, only
the appropriately noticed, per the Rental Agreement, the required
threshold, prior to becoming effective, rent-rate increase to be
effective October 1, 1988. A copy is attached hereto as page (App15), Defendant's (Exhibit 6 ) , (R at 70).
The Appellant appropriately complied with the Respondent's
properly noticed rent-rate increase, utilizing the appropriate setoff

and

counterclaim

conversion,

amortization

(previously

warned,

of a

App-9,

lien, for
10, 13)

trover

and

and

verbally

demanded on September 10, 1989 (R at 70 par. 8) during which the
Respondent with full knowledge persisted in the willful violation
of the implied covenant to undisturbed access, since the demanded
court action is slow and very expensive during which time the
Respondent enjoyed the benefits of the Appellant's cash, but denied
inappropriately the Appellant's enjoyment to undisturbed access
professed as an implied covenant for nearly 5 months, on letter
dated October 10, 1988.

A copy is attached hereto as page (App-

16) Defendant's (Exhibit 8 ) , (R at 70).
-10-

The

Respondent's

authority—an

unnamed

duly
male

authorized
person

agent—with

appropriately

apparent

noticed

the

decreased rent October 20, 1988, to be effective retroactive for
October 1988 to be $40 for both storage units Nos. 143 and 144 and
for November 1988 to be $40 for both storage units Nos. 143 and
144, effective November 1, 1988.
A

copy

is attached

hereto

as

page

(App-17)

Defendant's

(Exhibit 7 ) , (R at 70). This appropriately noticed decreased rent
since October 20, 1988, has not been controverted or explained in
any way, (R at 50 par. 13), dated June 12, 1989, and (R at 46 par.
3) dated June 16, 1989.
The Respondent's affiant, Steven J. Nelson, asserts without
any evidence, contractual notification requirements, explanations,
or controverting statements, Affidavit dated May 15,1989, (par. 8
and 9 ) , (R at 56) (App-14) that Mthe monthly rental and the rental
value of the two units occupied by Echols is and has been at least
. . . $94 per month . . . effective in October."

The monthly

rental-rate is $40 per month for both units as noted as page (App17).

The monthly rental value is established from a rental-rate

verbal telephone "Cartel" as testified by the Respondent's affiant-Audrey Hooper's deposition dated April 29, 1989, page No. 12 as
page (App-11) and page No.13.

A copy is attached hereto as page

(App-18) (R at 50).
The Appellant appropriately complied with the Respondent's
properly noticed rent-rate decrease by the duly authorized agent-with apparent authority—an unnamed male person, utilizing the
appropriate set-off and counterclaim amortization of a lien, for
-11-

trover and conversion, previously warned
verbally demanded September 10, 1989
delivered—November 10, 1988.

(App-9, 10, 13) and

(R at 70 par. 8) hand

This was recognized, received and

accepted. A copy is attached hereto as page (App-19), Defendant's
(Exhibit 8), (R at 70).
The

Respondent,

once

again,

locked

the

Appellant's

appropriately amortized set-off and counterclaimed storage unit
doors from November 10, 1988 through January 5, 1989; admitted
second defense (R at 65, p. 2. par. 9) a continued and repeated
violation of the implied covenant to undisturbed access previously
warned October 10, 1988, as page (App-16), (R at 70).
The Appellant appropriately and in a timely manner once again
delivered the proper accounting amortization of the lien with the
duly authorized agent—with apparent authority—an unnamed male
person, who recognized, received and accepted the hand delivered
letter dated December 10, 1988 as full payment of rent. A copy is
attached hereto as page (App-20), (R at 70), Defendant's (Exhibit
8).
The Appellant appropriately and in a timely manner once again
delivered the proper accounting amortization of the lien with the
duly authorized agent—with apparent authority—an unnamed male
person, who recognized, received and accepted the hand delivered
letter dated January 10, 1989, as full payment of rent. A copy is
attached hereto as page (App-21), Defendant's (Exhibit 8), (R at
70).
The supervising principal, Mr. Steven J. Nelson, with full
knowledge of the non-cash amortizations at the time—October 1988
-12-

through January 1989—(App-16, 19, 20, 21), Affidavit of Steven J.
Nelson dated May 15, 1989 (Par. No- 2) as page (App-14), (R at 56)
filed a cause of action served by mail on January 20, 1989 (R at
74)

alleging

various

claims

against

the

Defendant-Appellant

notwithstanding his own demand to "take me to court", when the only
amount of cash owing to the Respondent was $160, [$40 times 4
months

equals

notwithstanding

$160,
the

amortizations
amount

owed

to

(App-16,
the

19,

20,

Appellant

21)]

from

the

Respondent in the amount of $5,557.57 as page (App-21), (R at 70).
The Respondent's $160 had already been subtracted from the amount
owing

to

the Appellant,

consequently

no

default

existed,

as

alleged.
The Appellant appropriately and in a timely manner once again,
delivered the proper accounting amortization of the lien to the
duly authorized agent—with apparent authority—an unnamed male
person, who recognized, received and accepted the hand delivered
letter dated February 9, 1989, as full payment of rent and further
recognition that the Rental Agreement was in full force and effect.
A copy is attached hereto as page (App-22) Defendant's (Exhibit 8),
(R at 70).
The Appellant appropriately and in a timely manner once again
and for the months of March, April, May, June and July, 1989,
delivered the proper accounting amortization of the lien to the
duly authorized agent—with apparent authority—an unnamed male
person, who recognized, received, and accepted the hand delivered
letters dated March 10, 1989, April 10, 1989, May 9, 1989, June 9,
1989, (R at 49) dated July 10, 1989, (R at 23). A copy is attached
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hereto as page Nos. (App-23 through App-27) respectively, as full
payment of rent and full recognition that the Rental Agreement was
in full force and effect.

No appropriate rent-rate increases were

received since October 20, 1988; nor was an appropriate Rental
Agreement

termination—written

notice—ever

served

on

the

Appellant, no default existed as alleged!
Notwithstanding the specific and relevant facts of the only
existing

Rental

Agreement

[notification

requirements],

the

Respondent's implied covenant to undisturbed access [the painted
sign], the appropriate and timely payments [App-4 and 7], at the
legal

noticed

rate

[App-4],

during

which

time

the Respondent

persisted with the willful and wanton violation of the implied
covenant to undisturbed access [R at 56 p. 3 par, 14 admitted]
directly causing damages for trover and conversion
warned

[previously

(App-9, 10, 13), (R at 70)] of the Appellant's business

property

[R at 69], ignoring foolhardily—the previous warnings

[App-9, 10, 13]—and the rule that the Appellant's duty to pay rent
was mutually dependant upon the Respondent's fulfillment of his
implied

covenant

to

undisturbed

access•

Consequently,

the

appropriate and timely set-off and counterclaim [White v. District
Court, (R at 50 p. 9)], the appropriate and timely amortizations
of the Appellant's lien [King v. Firm (R at 50 p. 9)] for the full
and timely payments of rent at the legal noticed rate [App-15 and
17].

The trial court granted a summary

judgment

against

the

Appellant on the surmised presumption that all of the Respondent's
asserted claims set forth in this motion for Summary Judgment dated
May

16, 1989,

(R at

56) were in fact valid; worthy of legal
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immediate enforcement, (R at 48) (App-45), dated June 15, 1989.
The Respondent, notwithstanding the Appellant's published
absence dated June 19, 1989, (R at 44 p. 2 par. 5 ) , the published
warning dated June 19, 1989, (R at 44 p. 2 par. 6) the minute entry
judgment dated June 15, 1989, instruction "Counsel for Plaintiff
is to prepare Order and Judgment," (R at 48) (App-45) tested his
judicial influence, as a lawyer, specifically violating Utah Code
of Judicial Administration Rule 4-504 (1), (2) and (5) (App-28) as
directed by the Court, set forth his own misconduct, Utah Code of
Judicial Administration Rule 8.4. (a) and (b) (App-29) by inducing
the Clerk of the Fourth Circuit Court, American Fork Department to
sign his proposed Execution, Order of Sale, and Writ of Restitution
dated June 28, 1989, (R at 42) in violation of Utah Code of
Judicial Administration Rule 4-403 (2) and (3) (App-30) thereby
setting

into

Judicial

motion

Code

Nos.

violations
78-36-1

against

"Forcible

the Appellant.
Entry"

and

Utah

78-36-2(2)

"Forcible Detainer" (App-31) whereby in the Appellant's published
absence

seized

upon

the Appellant's,

his

spouse's,

and his

children's personal and business property stored at American Self
Storage in violation of the Constitution of the United States
Amendments

IV and XIV

(App-32) and Utah Peaceable

Possession

statute Utah Judicial Code 78-36-9 (App-33) (R at 69 p.4 para. 12)
the Appellant had been in the quiet possession thereof for the
space of one whole year continuously next before the commencement
of the proceedings and that his interest therein is not then ended
or determined.

Review (R at 42) executed during the Appellant's

published absence, since June 28, 1989.
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The Appellant filed on July 10, 1989, a Motion for a Temporary
Restraining Order (R at 35) and a proposed Order to Grant Temporary
Restraining against the Plaintiff (R at 33). The court granted the
Temporary Restraining Order, the Honorable Judge Dimick signed on
July 11, 1989. However, in violation of the Temporary Restraining
Order (R at 33) and the unauthorized clerk-signed court orders (R
at 42) the court, the Honorable Judge Dimick violated Utah Code of
Judicial Conduct Canon Nos. 1, 2(a), 3(3), and (4), as page (App34) setting forth improper exparte communications to the Sheriff's
office and to opposing council as to not abiding by the terms and
conditions of the said signed court orders.
The Respondent's legal council, Mr. Lynn P. Heward, violated
Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 3.4. (c) as page (App-35) not obeying the said signed Court
Orders [Temporary Restraining—Exempt Property (R at 42)] Rule
8.3.(b)

and

page

(App-36)

failed

to

properly

report

the

inappropriate conduct set forth in the above stated paragraph and
Rule 8.4.(d) and (f) as page (App-37) knowingly assisted a judge
or judicial officer [the Sheriff] in conduct that is a violation
of applicable Rules of Judicial Conduct or other law, the Forcible
Entry, the Forcible Detainer, statutes U.S. Constitution 4th and
14th Amendments (App-32) during the Appellant's published absence,
further and again on July 11, 1989, prior to 12 noon; the Exempt
Property

Laws—Utah

Judicial

Code

78-23-0 as page

(App-38),

Constitution of Utah, Art. XXII Sec. 2. [Property rights of married
women] as page (App-39) on July 11, 1989, whereby the officiating
Sheriff proclaimed

under the prearranged directions from the
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Respondent, that the Appellant was under arrest for trespassing and
that any inspections of the property could not be made unless the
Appellant was to be locked in (R at 31).

Subsequently, to the

Appellant's demanded execution (R at 31) the Honorable Judge Dimick
filed minute entry dated July 12, 1989, (R at 32) whereby the
Appellant was denied any access, property accounting, etc.; no
force or effect whatsoever to any exempt property rights of the
Appellant, his spouse, or his children.
The Respondent filed several motions with the trial court
commencing June 27, 1989, through July 14, 1989, perhaps the most
significant

ones were

filed

subsequent

to the verbal

exparte

communications dated July 11, 1989, the refusal to obey either
signed court order [Temporary Restraining and Exempt Property (R
at

42)] with

the

trial

court, whereby

conspired actions needed window dressing.

the

orchestrated

and

Hence, objection to

Defendant's motion for a temporary restraining order dated July
12, 1989, (R at 28), and objection to Defendant's motion to vacate
Summary Judgment dated July 12, 1989, (R at 29).

The Appellant

filed several motions with the trial court commencing June 19,
1989, through July 21, 1989, in attempting to make the court aware
of the genuine issues needed to be resolved that were judicially
ignored in the legally presumptive Summary Judgment dated June 15,
1989, (R at 48) (App-45).
Perhaps the Appellant's most significant summary of genuine
issues is that found on July 17, 1989, Appellant's motions (R at
22) and (R at 24). The Appellant's motion for a new trial dated
June 19, 1989, (R at 45) meant nothing for this State's case law
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is just a written story with no force or effect.

The Respondent's

objection to Appellant's motion for a new trial (R at 41) set forth
several

genuine

issues

to

no

avail

for

the

Appellant.

Consequently, the Trial Court ruling dated July 20, 1989, (R at 18)
(App-46) exhausted the judicial proceedings in the lower court.
The Appellant, appropriately and in a timely manner filed
notice of Appeal dated July 20, 1989, (R at 15) and appropriately
in a timely manner served the Respondent with the Notice of Appeal-Rules of Court of Appeal Rule 3(e); also served the Respondent
with Notice of Property Bond Utah Judicial Code No. 78-36-8.5. (1)
2(b).
"This notice shall be served in the same
manner as service of summons • . . The form of
the bond is at the Defendant's option . . .
The Defendant may remain in possession if he
executes . . . bond."
copy of the cited judicial code as page (App-40) and a copy of
the cited service is as page (App-1).
The Respondent, notwithstanding the Exempt Property
Constitution

of Utah, Art. XXII

Sec. 2.,

(App-39);

laws—

the Utah

Exemption Act. Code No. 78-23-0 (App-38); the unauthorized clerksigned

court

orders dated

June

28, 1989,

(R at

Appellant's personally served property bond—at 9:40

42) and

a.m.—dated

July 21, 1989, (App-1) with the specific language:
H

the

In no event, however, shall such action by
the court relieve the party obtaining the same
[American Self Storage] from any liability
which may be incurred in consequence of the
action taken by him, [them] for which he shall
be and continue to be liable to any other
person [William L. Echols] or part as fully
and completely as if a bond or undertaking
were in fact given. Namely: the Auction to

commence on July 25, 1989, at 12 noon."
maliciously with timely forewarning disposed of the Appellant's,
his

spouse's, and

his

disclosed sum of $2,300.

children's

property

for

the

purported

(R at 79) and (AR at attach No. 2B and

7) and (AR at par. Nos. 27 and 28).
The Respondent's request for bonding pursuant to Rules Utah
Court of Appeals No. 6, and the Appellant's dispute over the sale
of his personal and business property as affecting any bonding;
thus the Trial Court instituted Notice of Setting dated August 23,
1989, (AR at par. 2) and (AR at attach. No. 1 ) .
The Appellant and the Respondent appeared in the Trial Court
on September 26, 1989, at 9 a.m. pursuant to the Notice of Setting
with

some

unusual

circumstances

surrounding

the

hearing—Oral

Arguments i.e. bonding—specifically (AR at par. Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6,
and 7) and (AR at attach Nos. 3, 2, 4, 6, and 5 ) .
The Respondent with the judicial entrapment of the Appellant
while appearing for Oral Arguments i.e. Bonding, verbally motioned
the Trail Court subsequent to Oral Arguments for an immediate
Supplemental Relief motion, Utah Judicial Code No. 78-33-8, as page
(App-41) whereby

the Trial Court granted

the immediate motion

against the Appellant specifically (AR at par. Nos. 8, 9, 10, 11,
12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18) and (AR at attach Nos. 7, 8, 9, 10,
11, 12, 13, and 14).
The Appellant is entitled to damages arising from the sale of
exempt property, specifically (AR at par. Nos. 19, 23, 27, 28, 29,
30, 31, and 32) and (AR at attach Nos. 15, 14, 10, and 11).
STATEMENT OP THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
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I.
against

Did the Trial Court err in granting a Summary Judgment
the

Appellant

in

considering

rent-rate

increases

in

violation of the Rental Agreement notification requirementsy as to
a required thresholdf prior to becoming effective?
II.

Did the Trial Court err in granting a Summary Judgment

against the Appellant in not recognizing rent-rate decreases not
subject to Rental Agreement notification requirements, as to a
required threshold, prior to becoming effective?
III.
against

Did the Trial Court err in granting a Summary Judgment

the Appellant

in not

recognizing

that

the supervising

principal had full knowledge of the duly authorized managing agent-with apparent authority—at the time in performing specific acts:
(A)
(B)
(C)
(D)
(E)
(F)

Establishment of initial rent-rates.
Establishment of increased rent-rates.
Establishment of decreased rent-rates.
Inappropriately locking the Appellant's rent-paid
storage unit doors, wilfully violating the implied
covenant to undisturbed access.
The acceptance of the timely paid, and the
appropriate amount of cash rental payments.
The acceptance of the timely paid and the
appropriate amount of non-cash amortization of the
Appellant's lien for the timely rental payments.

as to constituting ratification of those acts, by the principal?
IV.

Did the Trial Court err in granting a Summary Judgment

against the Appellant

in not recognizing that the Appellant is

entitled to an appropriate set-off and counterclaim, for trover and
conversion of his business property, the non-cash amortization of
a lien, directly resulting from the Respondent's wilful and wanton
locking of the Appellant's rent-paid storage unit doors, a clear
violation by the Respondent, of the Respondent's implied covenant
to undisturbed access?
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V.

Did the Trial Court err in granting a Summary Judgment

against the Appellant in not recognizing the

Appellant's rights

to possession of the Respondent's premises in violation of the
Rental Agreement termination requirements, particularly when the
rent was fully paid and accepted; notwithstanding the Respondent's
wilful and wanton breach of the implied covenant to undisturbed
access?
VI.

Did

the

Trial

Court

err

in

signing

the

Order

of

"Execution" dated June 28, 1989, the "Order of Sale" dated June 28,
1989, and the "Writ of Restitution" dated June 28, 1989, in direct
violation of Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-403 (1),
(2), and (3); thereby seizing the Appellant's, his spouse's, and
his children's property including self-help to the property, during
his published absence dated June 19, 1989, in direct violation of
Utah

Judicial

Code

Nos. 78-36-1

"Forcible Detainer", 78-36-9
of

Utah,

Art

XXII

Sec.2.,

"Forcible

Entry",

78-36-2(2)

"Peaceable Possession"; Constitution
Constitution

of

U.S.

IV

and

XIV

Amendments?
VII.

Did the Trial Court err in, minute entry dated July 12,

1989, not allowing the Appellant:
(A)
(B)
(C)
(D)

Access to the seized property.
Verified accounting of the seized property.
Exempt
property
allowances
pursuant
to
the
unauthorized Order of "Execution" and "Order of
Sale" dated June 28, 1989.
Exempt property allowances pursuant to:
(1) Constitution of Utah, Art XXII Sec. 2.
(2) Utah Exemptions Act, Judicial Code 78-23-0.

notwithstanding, the Appellant's motion for Temporary Restraining
Order, the Appellant's signed Temporary Restraining Order on July
-21-

11, 1989, and the prepared Execution unsigned dated July 12, 1989?
VIII.

Did the Trial Court err in selling the Appellant's, his

spouse's, and his children's exempt property on July 25, 1989, at
12 noon in violation of:
(A)
(B)

(C)
(D)

IX.

The Appellant's property bond—Utah Judicial Code
78-36-8.5, WARNING to the Respondent served July 21,
1989, at 9:40 a.m.
Constitution of Utah, Art. XXII Sec.2., since most
of the property items stored in the facilities were
those of the Appellant's separated wife and
children.
The Utah Exemption Act.
Exempt
property
allowances
pursuant
to
the
unauthorized Order of "Execution" and "Order of
Sale" dated June 28, 1989?

Did the Trial Court err in granting a verbal motion for

supplemental relief, Utah Judicial Code No. 78-33-8 against the
Appellant, Pro-se during the properly noticed—Oral Arguments—
re: bonding in violation of:

X.

(A)
(B)

Utah Judicial Code No. 78-33-8.
Utah Judicial Code No. 78-4-7(f) since the case was
on Appeal—in Utah Court of Appeals.

(C)

U.S. Constitution 14th Amendment?

Did

the Trial Court err

in usurping

jurisdiction

in

violation of the Utah Judicial Code No. 78-4-7-(f) since the case
was on Appeal, in Utah Court of Appeals for improperly noticed—
verbal motion—supplemental relief—Utah Judicial Code No. 78-338,

whereby

the

Appellant,

was

required

to

answer

questions, without appropriate property accounting

numerous

i.e. EXEMPT

PROPERTY; thus held in Contempt of Court in the Utah County jail,
without appropriate written questions, (knowledge) for the purpose
of locating and seizing other Appellant's property, constituting
unlawful incarceration?
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XI.

Is the Appellant entitled to the reimbursement of the

actual property—undamaged—or

the monetary current replacement

value for trover and conversion of the sold exempt property as a
minimum, but all property should be fully replaced?
XII.

Are the Appellant, his spouse, and his children entitled

to injunctive relief, all damages which include but not limited to
unlawful incarceration, reputation, mental cruelty, mental anguish,
punitive, property replacement—including video games—since the
sale of spare parts and repair manual—Appellant's Exempt Property-renders them valueless whereby the remaining aged life is very
limited,

the

reinstatement

of

the

Appellant's

counterclaim,

commingled with the appropriate amended counterclaim, costs and
attorney's fees no less.

Utah Judicial Code No. 78-23-13?

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS SET OUT IN THE SEPARATE APPENDIX
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

U.S. Constitution 4th and 14th Amendments.
Utah Constitution Art. XXII Sec. 2.
State of Utah Statutes.
State of Utah Rules of Administration.
State of Utah Judicial Conduct.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The Trial Court erred in granting a Summary Judgment against
the Appellant in considering rent-rate increases in violation of
the Rental Agreement, in not recognizing rent-rate decreases, in
not recognizing ratification by the Respondent, in not recognizing
the Respondent's persisted violation of the implied covenant to
undisturbed access, in not recognizing the Appellant's rights to
counterclaim and possession of the premises, in not following
appropriate procedures for accountability of the Appellant's exempt
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property, unlawfully selling exempt property, unlawful supplemental
relief proceeding, unlawful incarceration, and the Appellant's
entitlement to property and damages, all discussed and argued in
the following numbered issues: I through XII.
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENTS
ISSDE I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST
THE APPELLANT IN CONSIDERING RENT-RATE INCREASES IN VIOLATION OF
THE RENTAL AGREEMENT NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS, AS TO A REQUIRED
THRESHOLD, PRIOR TO BECOMING EFFECTIVE, (APP-42).
"Owner may increase the Rent by notifying
Occupant in writing at least 15 days prior to
the first day of the month for which the
Increased Rent is due. Occupant shall pay the
Increased Rent from the date it becomes
effective* An Occupant unwilling to pay the
Increased rent may terminate the Rental
Agreement as provided in Item III below.w
In order for an increase in rent to be effective the first day
of the month it must be notified to the Occupant by the 15th day
of the month prior to becoming effective.
increase

to be effective January

to

follow

the

remaining

the rent

1, must be notified

Occupant ini writing by December 15.
Occupant

For example:

to the

This must be so, for the

portion

of

the

said

Rental

Agreement i.e. "An occupant unwilling to pay the Increased Rent may
terminate the Rental Agreement as provided in Item III below.'1
"Occupant or Owner may terminate the Occupancy
created by this Rental Agreement by delivering
written notice to the other party of its
intention to do so at least 15 days prior to
the last day of the Rental Month."
Consequently, the 15th day of each month constitutes decision day
for the Occupant, given Owner periodic properly notified rent-rate
increases whereby the Occupant would be required to move out by the
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end of the month if given appropriate written notice to the Owner
of his intention to do so.
The

beginning

of

any

month

the

effective

rent-rate

is

determined by the proper notification requirement 15 days prior to
that date, or the existence of the legal rate.

For example:

the

rent increase notified on May 24 is not effective on June 1.

The

required 15 days prior to the 1st day of the month notification
requirement

threshold

has not been met.

Neither

increase notified on May 24 effective on July 1.

is the rent

Since the rent

for June is the same effective legal rent-rate prior to May 24th,
which pivots on the 15th day of each month prior

to becoming

effective in order for the occupant to make appropriate decisions
as to occupancy termination.
In the case at bar, the Trial Court clearly erred in requiring
the Appellant to pay $80 per month for the months of June, July,
August and September 1988, (R at 56 p. 3 par. 14) resulting from
the improperly
Furthermore,

notified

the

Trial

rent-rate increase
Court

clearly

erred

(App-8)
in

(R at 70).

requiring

the

Appellant to pay $94 per month for the months of October, November,
December 1988, and January, February, March, April, May, June, and
July 1989.

(R at 56 p. 5 par. 29), since the appropriate legal

rental-rate was properly amortized (APP-16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24,
25, 26, and 27) pursuant to the appropriate rent-rate decrease
(APP-17) which has never been appropriately increased.

(R at 50

par. 13) and (R at 46 par. 3). The Trial Court's reliance upon the
Respondent's assertions (R at 56 par. 14 and 29), were clearly in
err and a violation of the contractual notification requirements.
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A case in point states:
M

. . . a foundational rule is that if there is
any doubt or uncertainty in the language, it
should be strictly construed against the
plaintiff landlord, who furnished the lease
and required the tenant to sign.11
Bonneville on the Hill Co, v. Sloane, 572 P.2d 403 (Utah 1977); see
also

Wolfe v. White, 225 P.2d 731, 732 (Utah 1950).
ISSUE II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST
THE APPELLANT IN NOT RECOGNIZING RENT-RATE DECREASES NOT SUBJECT
TO RENTAL AGREEMENT NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS, AS TO A REQUIRED
THRESHOLD, PRIOR TO BECOMING EFFECTIVE.
The

Rental

requirements, as

Agreement
to a

makes

required

no

specific

threshold,

effective, for rent-rate decreases.

notification

prior

to

becoming

Therefore, the appropriately

noticed decreased rent dated April 20, 1988, to be effective May
1, 1988, (App-4).

Clearly changed the rental rate to $55 per month

to be effective May 1, 1988. The Appellant in a proper and timely
manner,

pursuant

to

the

terms

and

conditions

of

the

Rental

Agreement, (App-42) which states, II Rent:
"Occupant shall pay in legal currency to Owner
at the Owner' s agent located at the site in
advance, on the first day of the month, the
Rent for that month. Occupant agrees to pay
a $7 late fee for all payments not received
within 10 days from the first day of the
subject month for which payment is due."
paid the appropriately noticed decreased rent (App-4) on May 6,
1988, which was recognized, received, accepted, and deposited in
the bank on May 7, 1988, (App-4), by the duly authorized agent—
with apparent authority.
The case at bar denied the apparent authority—Ms. Audrey
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Hooper, (R at 65 p.2 par lf 2, and 3) which states: "Admits, but
affirmatively alleges that the said agents had no authority on
their own to reduce the rent."
A case in point states:
"It is a general principle of law of agency,
running through all contracts made by agents
with third parties, [the Appellant] that the
principals [the Respondent] are bound by the
acts of their agents [Ms. Audrey Hooper] which
fall within the apparent scope of the authority
of the agents, and that the principal will not
be permitted to deny the authority of their
agents against innocent third parties, who have
dealt with those agents in good faith."
Harrison v. Auto Securities Co,, 257 P. 679 (Utah 1927).
Furthermore, since the Rental Agreement did not have specific
language as to rent-rate decreases as to notification requirements
prior to becoming effective there is no bar, or requirement for the
Appellant to pay anything other than the appropriately noticed
amount of rent in a timely manner.
A case in point states:
M

. . . a foundational rule is that if there is
any doubt or uncertainty in the language, it
should be strictly construed against the
plaintiff landlord, who furnished the lease
and required the tenant to sign."
Bonneville on The Hill Co. v. Sloane, 572 P.2d 403 (Utah 1977);
see also Wolf v. White, 225 P.2d 731, 732 (Utah 1950).
The non-cash payment of rent at the reduced rate dated October
20, 1988, (App-17) involves other issues presented for review.
However the reduction portion of the issue is uncontroverted in any
way (R at 50 par. 13) dated June 12, 1989, and (R at 46 par. 3)
dated

June

16,

1989,

with

the

-27-

same

arguments

as

above.

Furthermore, the monthly rental-rate of $40 per month (App-17) and
the monthly rental value of the asserted $94 per month (App-14 par.
8 and 9) must be differentiated since the rental value must pass
through

the

notification

required

threshold,

requirements

the

prior

to

establishing the monthly rental-rate.
October 20, 1988.

appropriate

becoming

contractual

effective,

thus

This did not happen since

Consequently, the effective legal rental rate

is $40 per month for both units. The Trial Court's reliance upon
the Respondent's assertions (R at 56 par. 14 and 29) were clearly
in

err

and

a

violation

of

the

contractual

notification

requirements.
ISSDE III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST
THE APPELLANT IN NOT RECOGNIZING THAT THE SUPERVISING PRINCIPAL
HAD FULL KNOWLEDGE (APP-11) OF THE DULY AUTHORIZED MANAGING AGENT-WITH APPARENT AUTHORITY—AT THE TIME—IN THE PERFORMING OF
SPECIFIC ACTS: (R AT 65 P.2 PAR. 1, 2, AND 3); AS TO CONSTITUTING
RATIFICATION OF THOSE ACTS BY THE PRINCIPAL.
(A) Establishment of the initial rent-rates (App-42).
(B) Establishment of increased rent-ratesf Feb. '88 and
(App-15).
(C) Establishment of decreased rent-rates (App-4 and
17).
(D) Inappropriately locking the Appellant's rent-paid
storage unit doors wilfully violating the implied
covenant to undisturbed access (R at 56 p. 3 par.
14 and 23).
(E) The acceptance of the timely paid rent at the
appropriate legal notified amount of cash rental
payments (App-4 and 7).
(F) The acceptance of the timely paid rent at the
appropriate legal notified amount of non-cash
amortizations of the Appellant's lien for the
current rental payments (App-16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23,
24, 25, 26, and 27).
The case at bar with the specific relevant fact citations as
noted above clearly renders to the Appellant the appropriate claim
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of ratification, whereby the Respondent is required to pay instead
of the Appellant.
"Ratification relates back to the time when the
unauthorized act was done; and although the
act may have been done without any precedent
authority, ratification creates the relation
of principal and agent."
Zeese v. Estate of Siegel, 534 P.2d 89 (Utah 1975).
"A deliberate and valid ratification with full
knowledge of all the material facts is binding
and cannot afterward be revoked or recalled."
Bradshaw v. McBride, 649, P.2d 78 (Utah 1982).
"It is a general principal of the law of
agency, running through all contracts made by
agents with third parties, that the principals
are bound by the acts of their agents which
fall within the apparent scope of the authority
of the agents, and that the principals will not
be permitted to deny the authority of their
agents against innocent third parties who have
dealt with those agents in good faith."
Harrison v. Auto Securities Co., 257 P. 679 (Utah 1927).

Clearly

and precisely the Trial Court erred in granting a Summary Judgment
against the Appellant in requiring the Appellant to pay for the
ratified

acts of

the Respondent; no default

exists, and

the

Appellant was entitled to possession.
ISSUE IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST
THE APPELLANT IN NOT RECOGNIZING THAT THE APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO
AN APPROPRIATE SET-OFF AND COUNTERCLAIM, FOR TROVER AND CONVERSION
OF HIS BUSINESS PROPERTY, THE NON-CASH AMORTIZATION OF A LIEN,
DIRECTLY RESULTING FROM THE RESPONDENT'S WILFUL AND WANTON LOCKING
OF THE APPELLANT'S RENT-PAID STORAGE UNIT DOORS, A CLEAR VIOLATION
BY THE RESPONDENT, OF THE RESPONDENT'S IMPLIED COVENANT TO
UNDISTURBED ACCESS.
The

relevant

facts

of

the

case

at

bar

is clear.

The

Respondent has, where all can see (the painted sign), declaring the
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implied covenant to undisturbed access.

The Respondent adamantly

admits locking the Appellant's rent-paid storage unit doors, (R at
56 p. 3 par. 14 and
appropriate

and

23) at the same time when accepting

timely payments of

rent

(App-4 and

7).

the
The

Appellant properly and appropriately warned of damages for the
wilful locking of his storage unit doors (App-9, 10, and 13) and
the Appellant's attempt to settle September 10, 1988, (R at 70 par.
8).
The California Courts recognition of implied covenants of
habitability

should be differentiated

in this case at bar

to

reflect the same enforcement for undisturbed access thereby giving
tenants'
landlords

rights

for

unlawful

counterclaim

wilful

directly

locking

of

resulting

the storage

from

the

unit doors.

Please review the court's discussions in Green v. Superior Ct. of
City and Cty. of San Francisco, 517 P.2d 1178, 1179, 1180, 1181,
1182 (Cal. 1974), and consider that:
M

Once we recognize that the tenant's obligation
to pay rent and the landlord's [implied
covenant to undisturbed access] are mutually
dependant, it becomes clear that the landlord's
breach of such [implied covenant] may be
directly relevant to the issue of possession.
If the tenant can prove such a breach by the
landlord,
he may
demonstrate
that
his
nonpayment of rent was justified and that no
rent is in fact "due and owing" to the
landlord. Under such circumstances, of course,
the landlord would not be entitled to
possession of the premises."
See also Jarvin v. First National Realty Corporation, 428 F.2d 1082
(U.S. CA 1970).
" . . . the landlord sued for possession for
nonpayment of rent. Under contract principles,
however, the tenant's obligation to pay rent
is dependant upon the landlord's performance
-30-

of his obligation;
undisturbed access].11

[Implied

covenant

to

More at home in Hall v. Warren, 632 P.2d 850 (Utah 1981) and
similar

to

the

case

at

bar

the

court

enforced, as

read

by

implication, various housing codes whereby in the case at bar the
Appellant

requires

undisturbed access.

enforcement

of

the

implied

covenant

to

The court states:

"Under familiar legal principles the provisions
of the city's housing code relating to minimum
leasing standards were by implication read into
and became a part of the rental agreement.11
therefore, by implication the professed, HYou keep the key", must
apply and the subsequent damages should be paid to the Appellant
for trover and conversion.
Similar to the case at bar is Gray v. American Surety Company
of New York, 277 P.2d 438, 439 (Cal. 1954) which states:
"Whether personal property, unjustly taken is
put to use or placed in storage, its reasonable
rental value is just the same. It belongs to
its owner and he is entitled to the value of
its use."
Therefore, the Appellant's business property [video games and pool
table] inappropriately and unlawfully locked up during the first
rent-rate-reduction period of time, nearly five months, (R at 56
p. 3 par. 14) should clearly accrue damages against the Respondent
for which appropriate and timely amortizations of current rents
have been paid, (App-16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, and 27);
then appropriately demanded in his counterclaim.
Set-off and counterclaim

is not new to Utah

in applying

counterclaims against unlawful detainer action for possession of
realty,

White

v.

District

Court,
-31-

232

P.2d

785

(Utah

1951).

Consequently/ the Appellant's counterclaim should be reinstated to
apply to the measurement of any damages purported and proved by
the Respondent, no default exists.

Therefore, the Trial Court

clearly erred in granting a Summary Judgment against the Appellant
in not recognizing that the Appellant is entitled to an appropriate
set-off and counterclaim, for the persisted violations of the
implied covenant to undisturbed access. Thus, an appropriate lien,
Utah Code Annotated (1988) section 38-1-20, (App-44) was made and
amortized.
ISSUE V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST
THE APPELLANT IN NOT RECOGNIZING THE APPELLANT'S RIGHTS TO
POSSESSION OF THE RESPONDENT'S PREMISES IN VIOLATION OF THE RENTAL
AGREEMENT TERMINATION REQUIREMENTS, ESPECIALLY WHEN THE RENT WAS
FULLY
PAID
AND
ACCEPTED—WITH
EITHER
CASH
OR
NON-CASH
AMORTIZATIONSf NOTWITHSTANDING THE RESPONDENT'S WILFUL AND WANTON
BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT TO UNDISTURBED ACCESS.
The Rental Agreement (App-42) states:
"Occupant or Owner may terminate the Occupancy
created by the Rental Agreement by delivering
written notice to the other party of its
intention to do so at least 15 days prior to
the last day of the Rental Month."
No place in the record of relevant facts is there a document by
either the Respondent or the Appellant that meets this required
contractual termination notification requirement.

Therefore, one

has to delve into payments and case law whereby the possession
issue can be resolved.
The case Woodland Theatres, Inc. v. ABC Intermountain, 560,
P.2d 701, 702 (Utah 1977) states:
"Where, by reason of a breach of a condition, a lease
becomes [in default], the lessor is entitled to recover
possession. He waves that right by the acceptance of
rent. He cannot accept the rent, and at the same time
-32-

claim a [default] of the lease."
Therefore, applying this case law to the facts at bar, the payments
(App-4 and 7) would resolve this issue in favor of the Appellant
and

deny

the

Respondent's

claim,

(R at

56

p.

3 par. 14).

Furthermore, in the same cited case it states:
"A landlord seeking enforcement of a [default]
must take care not to do anything which may be
deemed an acknowledgement of a continuation of
the tenancy.
Any act done by a landlord
knowing of a cause for [default] by his tenant,
affirming the existence of the lease and
recognizing the lessee as his tenant, is a
waiver of such [default].11
Therefore, applying this case law to the facts at bar, the timely
monthly amortizations that were recognized, received and accepted,
despite the filed cause of action, (R at 74 and 71) dated January
20, 1989, (App-16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, and 27), renders
this

issue

Respondent's
commingled

again

in

asserted
with

the

favor

of

the Appellant, and

claim

(R at

issue

of

56 p.

acceptance

3 par.
is

denies

the

14 and

23)

the

issue

of

amortization, since acceptance of cash may not be the same as
acceptance of amortization.

So one ponders the case Green v.

Superior Ct. of City and Cty. of San Francisco, 517 P.2d 1181 (Cal
1974) where it states:
H

If the tenant can prove such a breach by the
landlord [implied covenant to undisturbed
access], he may demonstrate that his nonpayment
of rent was justified and that no rent is in
fact 'due and owing' to the landlord. Under
such circumstances, of course, the landlord
would not be entitled to possession of the
premises."
The Respondent admits (R at 56 p. 3 par. 14 and 23) they locked the
Appellants rent-paid storage unit doors for nearly five months,
-33-

depriving the Appellant access to his business property whereby he
could not earn any cash. Therefore, the state of Utah has allowed
set-off and counterclaim as appropriate remedies for unlawful
detainer action for possession. White v. District Court, 232 P. 2d
785 (Utah 1951).

The Appellant applied this case in (R at 29 p.

3) to no avail, further applied in Court of Appeals Case No. 890455
to no avail. Nevertheless, the Court states in King v. Firm, 285
P.2d 1117 (Utah 1955) that:
"Thus under some circumstances a tenant would
be required to pay the rent or lose his rights
to the property under the lease, although the
landlord owed him more money than the amount
of the rent. This possibly would not be so if
it were undisputed that there was presently due
and owing from the landlord to the tenant more
money than the amount due and owing by the
tenant or the rent and the tenant definitely
claimed the
right to offset one claim against
the other.11
The Appellant definitely claimed this right (R at 69) to no avail;
the Appellant definitely provided timely and appropriate monthly
amortizations (App- 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, and 27) to
no avail.

The Trial Court clearly erred in granting a Summary

Judgment against the Appellant on the premise that the Respondent
was entitled to possession (R at 56 par. 12, 14, 16).
ISSUE VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SIGNING THE ORDER OF "EXECUTION"
DATED JUNE 28, 1989, THE "ORDER OF SALE" DATED JUNE 28, 1989, AND
THE "WRIT OF RESTITUTION" DATED JUNE 28, 1989, IN DIRECT VIOLATION
OF UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION RULE 4-403 (1), (2), AND
(3); THEREBY SEIZING THE APPELLANT'S, HIS SPOUSE'S, AND HIS
CHILDREN'S PROPERTY, INCLUDING SELF-HELP TO THE PROPERTY DURING HIS
PUBLISHED ABSENCE DATED JUNE 19, 1989, IN DIRECT VIOLATION OF UTAH
JUDICIAL CODE NOS. 78-36-1 "FORCIBLE ENTRY", 78-36-2(2) "FORCIBLE
DETAINER", 78-36-9 "PEACEABLE POSSESSION", CONSTITUTION OF UTAH,
ART XXII SEC. 2., CONSTITUTION OF U.S. IV AND XIV AMENDMENTS.
-34-

Notwithstanding the issue of possession previously discussed.
Issue V, the Appellant was in peaceable and actual possession at
the time of the Forcible Entry, Utah Judicial Code 78-36-9 (App33).

Since the Appellant specifically published his absence dated

June 19, 1989, (R at 44 p. 2 par. 5) for the period of time June
22, 1989, through July 9, 1989, and published a warning dated June
19, 1989, (R at 44 p. 2 par. 6 ) . The minute entry judgment dated
June 15, 1989, (R at 48) (App-45) has only the signature of the
Honorable John Backlund, Judge. The ruling required the Respondent
to submit a proposed order, with Appellant's conjecture, pursuant
to Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-504 (1), (2), and
(5) (App-28) which he did.

However, not received by the Appellant

until after the published warnings, and without sufficient enough
time to analyze before the required departure, set forth in the
published absence (R at 44 p. 2 par. 5) consequently, no proper
objection was made by the Appellant (R at 43). The Honorable John
Backlund, Judge has only his signature on the Order (R at 43),
dated June 28, 1989.

Therefore, the tested judicial influence by

the Respondent's lawyer may be classified as misconduct, Utah Code
of

Judicial

Administration

Rule

8.4.(a) and

(b)

(App-29) by

inducing the Clerk of the Fourth Circuit Court, American Fork
Department to sign his proposed Execution, Order of Sale, and Writ
of Restitution dated June 28, 1989 (R at 42).

This would be a

direct violation of Utah Code of Judicial Administration 4-403 (1),
(2), and (3) (App-30) since the Judges signature is the only one
on either

order.

Clerks do not have

the authority

to sign

supplemental procedure orders unless their signature appears with
-35-

the Judge's signature on the minute entry judgment or the order.
In this case they do not have both signatures!

(R at 48), (App-

45), and (R at 43).
The Respondent in his crafty set of orders (R at 42) during
the Appellant's published absence presupposes that all of the
property stored in the facilities is that of the Appellant.
Consequently, he recklessly omits the exempt property rights of
married women, Constitution of Utah, Art. XXII Sec. 2., the exempt
property rights of children should be the same as married women
from his set of orders, (R at 42).

Therefore, armed with the

auspicate unauthorized clerk-signed Court Orders (R at 42) breaks
into the properly rented facilities violating Utah statutes 7836-1 "Forcible Entry", 78-36-2(2) "Forcible Detainer", (App-31) 7836-9 "Peaceable Possession", during the Appellant's published
absence (App-33), further violating U.S. Constitutional Rights IV
and XIV Amendments

(App-32).

The unauthorized

rummaging and

pilfering the spoils, for who gives a care; the Clerk said it was
OK (R at 42), and the Sheriff said it will all be sold two days
after he gets here (R at 11); so what the hell, take what you want,
you're entitled to this property after all he has done to you; go
ahead get it out of here; when the Appellant gets back I will keep
him out of here claiming trespassing (R at 31 p.2), so who will
know the difference.
The case law which should apply to the facts at bar is Freeway
Park Bldg., Inc. v. Western States Wh. Sup., 451 P.2d 781 (Utah
1969) states:
"All that an occupant needs to show in order
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to be protected against self-help eviction is
to show that he was in peaceful possession of
the land within five days prior to the unlawful
entry.
If this is shown by a tenant in
possession, the one entitled thereto must
secure his rights under the statute; and if he
takes the law into his own hands and turns a
tenant in peaceable possession out by means of
force, fraud, intimidation, stealth, or by any
kind of violence, he makes himself liable to
that tenant for damages".
The Appellant believes the cited facts at bar make the Respondent
liable for damages, including mental pain and suffering; see also
Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 700 (Utah 1985).
ISSUE VII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MINUTE ENTRY DATED JULY 12, 1989, (R
at 32) NOT ALLOWING THE APPELLANT:
(A)
(B)
(C)

(D)

Access to the seized property demanded (R at 31 p.
3).
Verified accounting of the seized property demanded
(R at 31 p. 3).
Exempt property allowances pursuant to the auspicate
unauthorized clerk-signed "Order of Sale" and Order
of "Execution" dated June 28, 1989, (R at 42).
Exempt
property
allowances
pursuant
to
the
Constitution of Utah, Art. XXII Sec. 2. (App-39) and
the Utah Exemption Act, Judicial Code No. 78-23-0
(App-38) notwithstanding, the Appellant's motion for
a Temporary Restraining Order (R at 35) and the
signed Temporary Restraining Order on July 11, 1989,
(R at 33) and the proposed Execution unsigned dated
July 12, 1989 (R at 31).

This issue must look to the intent of the parties to comply
with

the

law and

the unauthorized

clerk-signed

Court Orders,

whereby the Appellant's, his spouse's, and his children's exempt
property rights have been wilfully violated by both the Trial Court
and the Respondent, at a time when they should have been protected
by the Courts.
First, one must review the Appellant's reaction specifically
-37-

(R at 35 par. 2, 6, 7, and 8) upon discovering that his previous
warning dated June 19, 1989, (R at 44 p. 2 par. 6) was directly
violated by the Court, the Sheriff, and the Respondent, orchestrating in a testeef malicious way to strip the Appellant of his
property, with no consideration whatsoever for his spouse's or
children's property.

All was the same to them [the Respondent].

The Respondent proclaims during the Appellant's published absence,
setting the tone and the stage for their malicious unlawful acts
(R at 40 p. 1 and 2) dated June 29f 1989.
"The Defendant has neither described nor offered any security
whatsoever.
would

In fact, his said Motion seems to have language that

indicate

that

for

various

reasons

the

Defendant

is

impecunious and no security could be made available for the benefit
of the Plaintiff.The Appellant responds (R at 36) dated July 10, 1989.

H

The

Defendant is impecunious directly resulting from damages caused by
the

Plaintiff's

illegal

and

unlawful

acts

of

conversion

specifically set forth in the Defendant's Counterclaim, [R at 69]. H
The

Respondent,s

surprised

reaction

to

the

Temporary

Restraining Order dated July 10, 1989, signed July 11, 1989, (R at
33) compounded their malicious scheme, thus refusing to abide by
either signed Court Order (R at 33) and (R at 42).

Leading the

troops was the Sheriff, asserting the law and the rights of the
Respondent, declaring the Appellant was trespassing (R at 31 p. 2)
and no property accounting was available unless he was to be
entombed and incarcerated within the storage units, (R at 31 p. 2)
dated July 12, 1989. A precise inference, with strong feelings of
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hate, that no exempt property claims would be honored even if they
were explicitly declared.
Any Court protection to the Appellant, his spouse, and his
children was obliterated with the prompt minute entry dated July
12, 1989 (R at 32) subsequent to the Appellant's filed Execution
dated July 12, 1989 (R at 31), claiming and asserting property
rights, which pursuant to Utah Judicial Code No. 78-23-12,

H

. .

. any other right under this chapter." (App-38) should have stopped
the sale until full accounting was made.
The Respondent further proclaims (R at 28) dated July 14,
1989.

"As to the irreparable damages specified in paragraph 6, it

was a long time in coming.

Defendant had a right for many months

to remove his belongings from Plaintiff's storage units, and he was
encouraged to exercise that right . . . He cannot complain now when
his assets are used to partially reimburse Plaintiff for rent and
legal cost."
Clearly neither the respondent, nor the Courts would honor
anything the Appellant wrote.
Court

Order, a valid

For example, a Temporary signed

Counterclaim,

Appellant's Execution, something

nor would

honor

less than an explicit

property claim, at a time when they should have.
entitled

they

the

exempt

The Appellant is

to serious damages for this grave err for which the

Appellant, his spouse, and his children continually suffer, Utah
Judicial Code 78-23-13 (App-38).
ISSUE VIII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SELLING THE APPELLANT'S HIS SPOUSE'S
AND HIS CHILDREN'S EXEMPT PROPERTY ON JULY 25, 1989, AT 12 NOON IN
VIOLATION OF:
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(A)
(B)

(C)
(D)

The Appellant's property bond—Utah Judicial Code
78-36-8.5. WARNING to the Respondent served July
21/ 1989/ at 9:40 a.m.
Constitution of Utah Art. XXII Sec. 2. Since most
of the property items stored in the facilities were
those of the Appellant's separated wife and
children.
The Utah Exemption Act.
Exempt
property
allowances
pursuant
to
the
unauthorized Order of "Execution" and "Order of
Sale" dated June 28, 1989.

The Appellant appropriately and in a timely manner

filed

Notice of Appeal dated July 20f 1989 (R at 15) and appropriately
in a timely manner served the Respondent at 9:40 a.m. with the
Notice of Appeal dated July 21f 1989f pursuant to Rules of Court
of Appeal Rule 3(e). He also served the Respondent with Notice of
Property Bond/ Utah Judicial Code No. 78-36-8.5 (1),

2(b), as page

(App-40)/ which states in part:
M

This Notice shall be served in the same manner
as service of Summons • . • The form of the
bond is at the Defendant's option . . . The
Defendant may remain in possession if he
executes . . . bond.H
A signed copy of the timely cited service is as page (App-1).
The Respondent notwithstanding

the Exempt Property

laws—

Constitution of Utah Art. XXII Sec. 2. (App-39); the Utah Exemption
Act Code No. 78-23-0 (App-38)#the unauthorized clerk-signed Court
Orders

dated

June

28 ,

1989/

(R at

42) and

the

Appellant's

personally served Notice of Appeal/ property bond/ and motion for
Extra Ordinary Writ (App-1) (AR at par. Nos. 27 and 28) with the
specific language that states:
H

In no event# however, shall such action by the
Court relieve the party obtaining the same
[American Self Storage] from any liability
which may be incurred in consequence of the
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action taken by him [them] for which he shall
be and continue to be liable to any other
person [William L. Echols] or party as fully
and completely as if a bond or undertaking were
in fact given. Namely: the Auction to commence
on July 25, 1989, at 12 noon.H
The Respondent maliciously with timely forewarning disposed of the
Appellant's, his spouse's, and his children's property for the
purported disclosed sum of $2,300f (R at 79) and (AR at attach Nos.
2B and 7 ) .

The Constitution of Utah Art. XXII Sec. 2. states:
"Real and personal estate of every female,
acquired before marriage, and all property to
which she may afterwards become entitled by
purchase, gift, grant, inheritance or devise,
shall be and remain the estate and property of
such female, and shall not be liable for the
debts, obligations or engagements of her
husband, and may be conveyed, devised or
bequeathed by her as if she were unmarried."

The

case

at

bar

brought

by

the

Respondent

against

the

Appellant who signed the Rental Agreement (App-42) makes the debt
that

of

the

Appellant's,

not

his

spouse

nor

his

children.

Consequently, there is no valid claim of any kind against his
spouse's

or

his children's property

that was maliciously

and

unlawfully sold, with forewarning on July 25, 1989 at 12 noon; thus
committing a wilful and very grievous act of Trover and Conversion,
for which great damage is being suffered by the Appellant, his
spouse and his children.

The Appellant is entitled to an Amended

Counterclaim resulting from this action, specifically filed with
the Court of Appeals dated July 27, 1989.
ISSUE IX
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A—VERBAL MOTION—FOR
SUPPLEMENTAL RELIEF—UTAH JUDICIAL CODE No. 78-33-8 AGAINST THE
APPELLANT, PRO-SE DURING THE PROPERLY NOTICED—ORAL ARGUMENTS—
RE: BONDING IN VIOLATION OF:
-41-

(A)
(B)
(C)

Utah Judicial Code No. 78-33-8 (App-41).
Utah Judicial Code No. 78-4-7(f) Since the case was
on Appeal—in the Utah Court of Appeals, (App-43).
U.S.Constitution 14th Amendment (App-32).

Utah Judicial Code No. 78-33-8, Supplemental Relief states:
(App-41)
M

Further relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree
may be granted whenever necessary or proper.
The
application therefore shall be by petition to a court
having jurisdiction to grant the relief.
If the
application is deemed sufficient, the court shall on
reasonable notice, require any adverse party, whose
rights have been adjudicated by the declaratory judgment
or decree, to show cause why further relief should not
be granted forthwith.
The Respondent properly petitioned the Trial Court for Bond
for costs on appeal pursuant to Utah Court of Appeals Rule No. 6.
The Appellant's dispute over the sale of his personal and business
property affecting any bonding (AR at par. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7)
and (AR at attach Nos. 1, 3, 2, 4, 5, and 6).

The Trial Court only

had jurisdiction for bonding, nothing else. Utah Judicial Code No.
78-4-7(f), since the case was on Appeal in the Utah Court of
Appeals. Consequently, the—verbal motion—was without appropriate
jurisdiction.

Furthermore, the reasonable notice portion of the

Supplemental Relief statute is violated since open Court—verbal
motion—does not constitute reasonable notice.
"The Due Process Clauses of the United States and
Utah Constitution require notice to a party before
his or her rights are affected by a judgment."
Graham V. Sawaya, 632 P.2d 853 (Utah 1981).
"An elementary and fundamental requirement of
due process in any proceeding which is to be
accorded
finality
is
notice
reasonably
calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the
action and afford them an opportunity to
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present their objections. The notice must be
of such nature as reasonably to convey the
required information, and it must afford a
reasonable time for those interested to make
their appearance.
Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1212 (Utah 1983).
The Appellant's due process rights—reasonable notice—were
clearly violated by the Trial Court. The verbal application is also
defective, since the Respondent is asserting that he can sell
exempt property despite the unauthorized clerk-signed Court Orders
(App-42), exempt property laws of this state (App-38, 39), no real
accounting of property. (AR par. 8) and (AR attach Nos. 2B and 7 ) .
What court will make them accountable?

For sure, not the Trial

Court!
Clearly the Trial Court erred in granting a—verbal motion-for supplemental relief causing great damages upon the Appellant
and his reputation; subsequently, refusing accountability of exempt
property for which the Appellant, his spouse, and his children
continually suffer.
ISSDE X
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN USURPING JURISDICTION IN VIOLATION
OF THE UTAH JUDICIAL CODE NO. 78-4-7 (f), SINCE THE CASE WAS ON
APPEAL—IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS, FOR THE IMPROPERLY NOTICED-VERBAL MOTION—SUPPLEMENTAL RELIEF—UTAH JUDICIAL CODE NO. 7833-8, WHEREBY THE APPELLANT WAS REQUIRED TO ANSWER NUMEROUS
QUESTIONS, WITHOUT APPROPRIATE PROPERTY ACCOUNTING I.E. EXEMPT
PROPERTY; THUS, HELD IN CONTEMPT OF COURT IN THE UTAH COUNTY JAIL,
WITHOUT APPROPRIATE WRITTEN QUESTIONS (KNOWLEDGE), FOR THE PURPOSE
OF LOCATING AND SEIZING OTHER APPELLANT'S PROPERTY, CONSTITUTING
UNLAWFUL INCARCERATION.
Closely related to this issue is the previous issue centered
on

the

due

process

clause

of

the

United

States

and

Utah

Constitution which require notice to a party before his or her
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rights are affected by a judgment.
(Utah 1981).

Graham v. Sawaya, 632 P.2d 853

The judgment in this issue is Contempt of Court for

which the Appellant was held illegally in the Utah County jail for
8 days (AR attach Nos. 9 and 14).
••Accordingly, in order to justify a finding of contempt
and the imposition of a jail sentence, it must appear by
clear and convincing proof that:
(1)
(2)
(3)

The party knew what was required of him.
That he had the ability to comply,
That he wilfully and knowingly failed
refused to do so."

and

Thomas v. Thomas, 569 P.2d 1121 (Utah 1977).
Given the fact that this Court may say that the Trial Court
had jurisdiction, and that the verbal notification requirements did
not violate constitutional questions
Contempt

for due process—was

of Court proper, notwithstanding

the unaccounted

the
for

exempt property?
The Respondent asked many questions which were not supplied
to the Court during the out of Court meeting, (AR at par. 9 and
10) only the ones supplied on (AR at attach No. 8) were filed.

The

Appellant was intimidated with many other questions that were not
filed, causing a real concern for the safety and security of his
family.
The Appellant did not have knowledge of all that was required
of him, noted on (AR par. 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14).

The Appellant,

upon being asked the questions that were filed with the Court, did
comply (AR par. 15 and 16), and (AR at attach Nos. 10, 11, and 12).
Nevertheless, he was sent back to jail until October 4, 1989 (AR
par. 17 and 18) and (AR at attach Nos. 13, 14, and 15).

-44-

Clearly, the Trial Court erred in unlawfully incarcerating
the Appellant for which great damage has been suffered, causing
severe emotional distress upon the Appellant, his mother, his
spouse, and his children for which a large amount of monetary
relief must be granted against the Respondent.
ISSUE XI
THE APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO THE REIMBURSEMENT OP THEIR ACTUAL
PROPERTY—UNDAMAGED—OR THE MONETARY CURRENT REPLACEMENT VALUE FOR
TROVER AND CONVERSION OF THE SOLD, EXEMPT PROPERTY AS A MINIMUM,
BUT ALL PROPERTY SHOULD BE FULLY REPLACED.
A case in point states:
H

A conversion is an act of wilful interference
with
a
chattel
done
without
lawful
justification by which the person entitled
thereto is deprived of its use and possession.
The measure of damages of conversion is the
full value of the property. It requires such
a serious interference with the Owner's right
that the person interfering therewith may
reasonably be required to buy the goods . . .
an auctioneer who sells them in good faith
becomes a converter since his acts are an
interference with the control of the property
or in other words, a claiming of the ownership
in such property and taking it out of the
possession of someone else with intention of
exercising dominion over it is a conversion.
Thus, a bona fide purchaser of goods for value
from one who has no right to sell them becomes
a converter when he takes possession of such
goods•"
Allred v. Hinkley, 328 P.2d 728 (Utah 1958).
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, the
facts are clear that the Respondent wilfully sold the Appellant1 s f
his spouse's and his children's exempt property on July 25, 1989,
at 12 noon, despite a written warning on July 21, 1989, at 9:40
a.m. (App-1), without any authority or legal right to do so (AR at
par. 27 and 28) and (AR at attach. No. 2B and 7), (R at 42 ), (App-45-

39, 38).

Consequently, the specific accounting requested (AR at

par. 30) must be made for the appropriate claims to be satisfied
by each, the Appellant, his spouse, and his children. Great damage
has been experienced

including severe pain and suffering. The

Appellant requires the Amended Counterclaim Motion to re reinstated
in his favor.
ISSUE XII
THE APPELLANT, HIS SPOUSE AND HIS CHILDREN ARE ENTITLED TO
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, ALL DAMAGES WHICH INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO
UNLAWFUL INCARCERATION, REPUTATION, MENTAL CRUELTY, MENTAL ANGUISH,
PUNITIVE, PROPERTY REPLACEMENT—INCLUDING VIDEO GAMES—SINCE THE
SALE OF SPARE PARTS AND REPAIR MANUAL—APPELLANT'S EXEMPT PROPERTY-RENDERS THEM VALUELESS WHEREBY THE REMAINING AGED LIFE IS VERY
LIMITED; THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE APPELLANT'S COUNTERCLAIM,
COMMINGLED WITH APPROPRIATE AUTHORITY TO AMEND, COSTS AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES, NO LESS.
Utah Judicial Code No. 78-23-13 states:
"An individual or the spouse or a dependent of the
individual is entitled to injunctive relief,
damages, or both, against a creditor. . . [for]
redress a violation of this chapter."
Consequently, the sale of the Appellant's, his spouse's, and his
children's Exempt property

(AR at par. 27 and 28) and

(AR at

attach. Nos. 2B and 7) (R at 42) requires the imposition of this
law whereby full restitution may be made.
CONCLUSION
The Trial Court clearly erred in granting a Summary Judgment
for the Respondent. A cursory perusal of the Rental Agreement, the
appropriate rent-rate notifications, the appropriate and timely
payments of cash, despite the Respondent's persisted violation of
the implied covenant to undisturbed access clearly establishes a
solid foundation for the Appellant's Counterclaim.
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Thus, yielding

an appropriate lien for trover and conversion of the business
property, whereby the Appellant definitely claimed that right,
delivering on a timely and regular basis the appropriate monthly
amortizations at the appropriate legal rate of rent, whereby each
monthly amortization has been recognized, received and accepted;
constituting

no

default

or

relinquishment

of

any

property

possession rights against the Appellant. The Respondent's ensuing
actions of

the fraudulent assertions obtaining

the wrongfully

granted and imposed Summary Judgment enforcement upon the Appellant
has resulted in:
published
threats

breaking

and entering during the Appellant's

absence, violaltions

of

accounting;

trespassing,
selling

the

of U.S. Constitutional

refusal

to make

Appellant's,

his

rights,

appropriate
spouse's,

property
and

his

children's exempt property—committing grievous acts of trover and
conversion, unlawful incarceration, for which great damage has been
suffered by the Appellant, his spouse and his children yielding a
damage amount far in excess of the trial Court's jurisdictional
limits.

Therefore, the Trial Court—Circuit

Court—should

be

reversed and the case remanded with an Order to the District Court
in favor of the Defendant-Appellant, where an appropriate trial can
take place—Counterclaim—against the Respondent.

In this event,

the Defendant-Appellant is entitled to full restitution of all
unexempted property that was previously sold, plus the payment of
all the costs accrued to date.

STATEMENT OF DESIRE TO BE HEARD IN ORAL ARGUMENTS
Defendant-Appellant hereby states that he desires to be heard
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in Oral Arguments upon submission of this case.
Respectfully submitted

William L. Echols, Pro-Se
Defendant and Appellant
733 North 800 West
Provo, Utah 84601
(801) 377-0705
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